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The purpose of this thesis was to identify the factors
influencing voluntary retention behavior of first and second
terra Air Force enlisted members. Further, how those factors
tended to differ across term of service and occupational group
was examined. Data were extracted from the 1985 DOD Survey
of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. Explanatory variables were
grouped into tenure, demographic, cognitive, and economic
categories.
Logit models were estimated for each term of service and
occupational sub group. The results show that the factors
affecting retention do tend to differ across term and
occupation. Some, like overall satisfaction, were significant
to everyone, while others, such as SRB, changed from one group
to the next.
Recommendations regarding future policy implications were
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I . INTRODUCTION
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY OF RETENTION
The issues of retention and turnover have been the focus
of a great deal of research in both the public and private
sectors. One reason is that turnover has both monetary and
nonmonetary implications. From a monetary perspective,
turnover is expensive. Recruiting, classifying and training
replacements costs money. From a nonmonetary perspective,
excessive turnover also results in lost experience, lower
productivity, and, in the military, reduced readiness.
For the military services, movements in retention rates,
especially in first-term retention rates, also affect the
ability of the All Volunteer Force (AVF) to meet its career
manning requirements. The active duty military relies on new
recruits for nearly all of its manpower. Without lateral
entry, a decline in retention rates could create a shortage
of experienced personnel . Such a shortage would have to be
accommodated by modifying personnel assignments. Members would
find themselves moved to accommodate needs at other locations
more often and for shorter periods of time. These shortages
could also reduce the overall capability of the military which
would lead to a reduced pace of operations. Reduced retention
rates also increase accession rates, which, while helping to
maintain overall force strength, would not solve the immediate
problems caused by the shortage because it takes time to get
new recruits trained, on the job, and productive.
Sustaining the AVF at current levels of operational
capability then, depends on the services' ability to both
recruit and retain qualified young men and women. First-term
attrition and low retention result in increased recruit
accessions. A key to reducing the recruiting and training
costs that accompany these accessions is to improve retention.
Past research has shown that turnover rates are affected
by many factors including demographic characteristics,
organizational commitment, family situation, job satisfaction
and job alternatives. Studies of the retention of enlisted
personnel have shown that turnover in the military is affected
by many of the same factors as turnover in the private sector,
as well as a number of factors unique to the military such as
Selective Reenlistment Bonuses (SRBs) and extended family
separations. The extent to which any one factor affects
turnover tends to differ between the military and the private
Sector. This may be due to the fact that the turnover
decision in the military is different than a similar decision
in the civilian community; in the military each member makes
his reenlistment decision at a specific, predictable point in
his career and must reenlist for a specified number of years.
The services have experimented with many different
incentives in an effort to improve overall retention. Some
of the reenlistment incentives applied by the services which
have proven successful in the past are expanded promotion
opportunities, favorable assignment locations, monetary
compensation and quality of life improvements. The Air Force,
for example, currently runs an assignment program known as
Voluntary Stabilized Base of Preference (VSBOP) . This program
allows members to volunteer for assignment to certain
locations with the guarantee of not moving again for at least
five years. One of the goals of this program is to reduce the
hardships caused by frequent moves which may affect the
retention decision.
For the most part however, efforts to reduce turnover in
the military have concentrated on pay and the use of
enticements such as selective reenlistment bonuses and special
pay entitlements. More empirical research needs to be done
concerning the effect both pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors
have on the reenlistment decision.
B. THREATS TO RETENTION IN THE 1990s
Relatively little research has focused on the factors that
influence an Air Force member's decision to either reenlist
or separate. This lack of research may well be due to the
ability of the Air Force to recruit and retain qualified
people. As Table 1 indicates. Air Force retention rates have
been consistent particularly with regard to the second-term
where retention rates have remained in the high 70% range.
The Air Force senior leadership attributes these retention
rates to increased emphasis on leadership and military values,
improved professional education, adequate recognition of
superior performance and a reasonable quality of life for the




Fy84 FY85 FY86 FY87 Fy88
First-term 62 54 58 65 55
Second Term 89 78 77 79 79
Career 96 96 96 97 97
Several factors however, may threaten this success. They
include a declining defense budget, an improved economy,
increased competition for labor and a shrinking manpower
pool . The defense budget has not increased in real terms
since 1986. Indications are that, in real terms, the 1990
budget will also be reduced. While some of the reduction,
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particularly in the Air Force, is due to a reduction in
programs (resulting from the INF treaty and continuing
negotiations with the Soviet Union) , some are the result of
budgetary demands to "do more with less". The FY 90
Department of Defense Manpower Requirements Report reflects
an overall reduction in Air Force enlisted manpower of .8% or
about 4600 people. Reduced budgets may also mean less money
for things that appear to affect retention, like pay and
SRBs.
Historically, an improved economy results in increased
civilian job opportunities and increased competition for a
labor supply which is relatively fixed in the short run. In
a study of the supply of enlisted volunteers conducted in
1979, Grissmer found that unemployment elasticities range from
.25 for Category III high school graduates to about .45 for
Category I and II high school graduates (Mental category is
a function of entrance exam scores. Category I is the top 7
percentile while Category III is the 31st to 64th percentiles)
[Ref. 2]. This says that a 1% increase in the unemployment
rate will cause a .45% increase in the number of Category I
and II high school graduates willing to join the service.
While this study addresses enlistment rather than
reenlistment, it is logical to assume that decisions to
reenlist will also increase as unemployment increases.
Competition for qualified people is with the other
branches of the armed services as well as with the private
sector. Of particular concern is the Air Force's need for
high-tech skills such as computer and electronics technicians.
Requirements for people with electronic and mechanical
aptitudes over the next decade are predicted to grow at a
faster rate than requirements for the non-technical skills
(see Figure 1). The development of Air Force space
operations, the continued expansion of computerization in
support functions, in digital, programmable self-testing
equipment and in sophisticated weapons systems will require
the people with the best of skills. These are precisely the
skills most in demand in both the private sector and the other
services.
Also contributing to future military manpower problems is
the shrinking youth population. The military services have
been aware of the "Birth Dearth" for quite some time.
Figure 2 shows a steady decline in the size of the male youth
population through 1992. The U.S. Census Bureau projects that
the number of 17 to 21 year old males will decline from a peak
of 10.8 million in 1978 to 8 . 4 million in 1994, a decrease of
24%. According to Congressional Budget Office estimates, the
military services will have to recruit one out of every seven
young men ages 18 and 19 in 1990 to maintain the current force
size given current retention rates. [Ref. 3]
* TOTAL ENLISTED REQUIRED
GENERAL ADMIN MECH ELECTRONIC
i 1982 K^ 2000
Figure 1 Enlis'ted Aptitude Requirements
In anticipation of this decline, the Air Force planned to
insure adequate recruiting and advertising dollars, enlistment
bonuses, pay comparability and strong retention programs
[Ref. 4]. However, due to budgetary constraints, some of the
monetary programs (enlistment bonuses, advertising programs,
etc.) will simply not be funded.
C. FOCUS OF THE THESIS
The personnel management tools of Air Force planners
generally fit into one of two categories; pecuniary or
nonpecuniary. Since the majority of pay related policies
require Congressional action, it is reasonable to expect Air
YOUTH POPULATION (Mlillona)
1984 1986 1988 1996 19981990 1992 1994
YEAR
Figure 2 Eighteen Year Old Youth Population
2000
Force policy makers to be aware of the nonpecuniary factors
which most significantly impact the retention decision and
tailor their efforts toward those areas.
This thesis will focus specifically on the retention of
first and second term Air Force enlisted members. While
several pecuniary factors will be considered, the majority of
the research will concentrate on nonpecuniary factors and
their influence on the retention decision.
A theoretical model of the turnover process is proposed.
The model is then "fit" to data for Air Force enlisted members
obtained from the 1985 Department of Defense Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel and the Enlisted Master File.
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Multivariate analysis is used to estimate the direction and
magnitude of the effect each variable has on the reenlistment
decision.
Chapter II introduces the concept of turnover in both the
private sector and public sector. The chapter reviews the
literature relevant to the theory of turnover with emphasis
on studies involving military personnel. The chapter also
presents a brief discussion of human capital theory as it
applies to the training investment.
Chapter III presents the methodology used to study the
retention decision. The data are discussed as well as any
restrictions or limitations imposed on the data for this
analysis. The theoretical model chosen is explained and the
categories of specific variables are introduced as they relate
to the theoretical model. Finally, the chapter presents the
econometric method chosen to evaluate the relative importance
each variable has on the retention decision.
Chapter IV presents the results of the statistical
analysis of the data. The affect each variable has on the
retention decision will be discussed with reference to partial
affects.
Chapter V summarizes the findings of the research and
draws conclusions based on those findings. Policy




This thesis is primarily concerned with determining which
factors most significantly influence the retention decisions
of first and second term Air Force enlisted members. Other
concerns include:
• What factors are the most important (positive or negative)
to the reenlistment decision?
• Are there significant differences between the factors
affecting first-term retention and those affecting second-
term retention?
• Does the length of initial formal training affect
retention?





Porter and Steers [Ref. 5] point out that the word
turnover often carries with it a somewhat negative
connotation. There is, to a large extent, an underlying
assumption that the reduction of all turnover is a desirable
goal. There are several reasons to question this. First,
from the individual's point of view, leaving an unrewarding
job may result in obtaining a more satisfying one. Second,
from the organization's standpoint, some of those who leave
may be ineffective performers and their departures may open
positions to better performers. The cost of efforts to retain
an ineffective performer may well exceed the benefits. Third,
given the current state of technological flux, turnover may
be considered a necessary evil. It may be necessary to simply
accept certain levels of turnover as the price for rapid
change and increased efficiency.
There is no doubt that excessive turnover is bad for the
organization, as increased recruitment and training costs must
be incurred as well as, in some cases, decreases in
productivity. Additionally, turnover can adversely affect
the social dynamics of a work organization.
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It is not surprising, then, that an extensive amount of
research has been done on the turnover process in both the
military and civilian sectors. This research has identified
many factors that influence an individual's decision to stay
in a particular job. This chapter reviews some of the past
literature. First a review of literature pertaining to
turnover in the civilian workplace will be presented, followed
by a review of some of the more recent studies of military
turnover. The chapter will conclude with a brief discussion
of human capital theory as it applies to training investments.
B. TURNOVER IN THR PRIVATE SECTOR
Research on turnover in the private sector has two fairly
distinct branches. Psychologists and management analysts have
tended to center their studies around the relationships
between job satisfaction and turnover, organizational
commitment and turnover and met expectations and turnover.
Economists, on the other hand, have focused on wages and the
theories of human capital and job matching. I turn first to
psychological studies.
Hulin [Ref. 6], for example, tested the effects of job
satisfaction on turnover in a Canadian company that had been
experiencing very high turnover for several years. He used
surveys to measure five aspects of job satisfaction. They
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included satisfaction with work, pay, supervision, promotions
and coworkers.
After the company revised several personnel policies the
surveys were readministered to both stayers and leavers. Not
only did the results indicate significant increases in
satisfaction with four of the five job descriptive indices,
but they also indicated significant differences between
stayers and leavers. Hulin concluded that there is indeed a
strong relationship between job satisfaction and turnover.
Price [Ref. 7] considered simple correlates of turnover.
He suggested a conceptual model of the turnover process aimed
at incorporating the variables with the most significant
correlates. His model suggested that five factors determine
job satisfaction, which in turn affects turnover: pay,
integration into the work group, instrumental communications,
formal communication, and centralization. Price's model
depicts job satisfaction combining with opportunity to leave
to determine actual turnover.
One of the limitations of these studies is the use of
simple correlates to infer causation. Zero order correlates
do not tell the whole story. Since independent variables
influence each other, the use of zero order correlates ignores
the independent relative effect of each explanatory variable
on turnover holding constant the other explanatory variables.
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Porter and Steers [Ref. 5] took the issue of job
satisfaction one step further. They hypothesized a conceptual
framework centering around the role of met expectations. This
model saw each individual as bringing to the employment
situation his own unique set of expectations. Porter and
Steers viewed job satisfaction as the total of an individual's
met expectations on the job—the more his expectations were
are met on the job the greater was his satisfaction. Porter
and Steers used a somewhat different classification of
variables than earlier studies. They used four categories of
factors representing "levels" in the organization. The
categories are organization wide factors, immediate work
environment, job related factors, and personal factors.
Rather than actually perform an analysis. Porter and Steers
classified the results of past studies into one of the four
categories above. Based on the findings of these past studies
they concluded that the issue of met expectations may indeed
be central to the turnover decision. A greater number of
those who stay were more likely to have experienced met
expectations.
Again there may be some inherent problems with this type
of comparison. First, the populations in the different
studies were heterogeneous. People with different
characteristics may act differently. Since the studies Porter
and Steers classified were done at different times, differing
14
economic circumstances may have caused different behaviors.
Finally, because the studies used different statistical
methods, the results may not be comparable
Steers and Mowday [Ref. 8] later extended the concept of
the relationship between expectations and turnover with a
three part model. The model sequentially addressed job
expectations and attitudes, job attitudes and intent to leave,
available alternatives and actual turnover. The model
suggests that intent to leave is influenced by both effective
responses to the job (job satisfaction, commitment) and non-
work influences (spouse concerns, family influences, life
outside work)
.
Steers and Mowday argued that turnover is ultimately
determined by a combination of behavioral intent to leave and
availability of alternative job opportunities driven by labor
market conditions and individual characteristics. While
Steers and Mowday did add to the theoretical understanding of
turnover, their model was based on past research that was
largely untested empirically and, where empirical research was
done, the methods tended to be less than statistically
rigorous.
Another behavior or attitude that is often hypothesized
to be related to turnover is that of commitment. One of the
most interesting studies of commitment was conducted by Marsh
15
and Mannari [Ref. 9], who attempted to examine why Japanese
companies have a lower turnover rates than American companies.
One of the most common explanations for this dramatic
difference had been the perceived commitment of Japanese
workers to their organization. As a result. Marsh and Mannari
employed the theory of lifetime commitment typified by the
feeling that, in Japan, a man enters an organization after
school with the expectation that he will remain in that
organization until retirement.
For purposes of analysis, explanatory variables were
grouped into five categories including formal status, extra
- bureaucratic status, social origins, attitudes and values,
and lifetime commitment. They then used regression analysis
rather than individual correlates to clarify the effect of
lifetime commitment on turnover holding other variables
constant. Their analysis yielded a number of significant
variables, including sex, chance for promotion, perceived
autonomy, and job satisfaction. The most significant finding
was that when other variables were taken into account,
lifetime commitment exerted no significant effect on turnover.
One of the advantages of this study compared with those
which preceded it is that Marsh and Mannari recognized the
weaknesses of previous methods of analysis. They used
multiple regression techniques that allowed them to compare
the influences of explanatory variables to each other and to
16
hold other variables constant while examining the impact of
each one reducing the problems of correlation present in less
involved methods.
Because of the number of different theories of turnover
that emerged between the early 1950s and the late 1970s,
several studies were conducted to either compare the
predictive power of the theories or to group similar
variables. One such study was conducted by Hom, Katerberg
and Hulin [Ref. 10], They attempted to compare the ability
of behavioral, commitment, and satisfaction models to
correctly predict turnover.
Hom et al tested these three general theories by first
using questionnaires to collect data relative to each of the
three theories. An analysis of the data showed a multiple
correlation between intention to stay and job satisfaction of
.57. The correlation between organizational commitment and
intent to stay was .68. Finally, the behavior model showed
the strongest correlation with intent to stay with R=.81.
The results of this work led Hom et al to three general
conclusions. First, all three approaches to the study of
turnover predicted, with high accuracy, the propensity of
individuals to stay in an organization. Second, they found
that the prediction of turnover becomes more accurate as
individals move closer to the actual decision point. Finally,
they concluded that job satisfaction may demonstrate a more
17
stable relationship with turnover than do organizational
commitment or social behavior models. One study (Hulin, 1966)
reported significant relationships between satisfaction and
turnover even with a lag of 12 months.
These results should however, be interpreted with caution
for several reasons. First, the differences in the behavioral
results may very well be due to the variations in statistical
rigor that underly the different models and their associated
methodologies. Second, using a survey to measure explanatory
variables for different behavioral phenomenon may introduce
different degrees of measurement bias across constructs.
A second study attempting to take an overall look at past
research was conducted by Muchinsky and Tuttle [Ref. 11].
They were less concerned with comparing the predictive power
of different models then they were with being able to classify
the explanatory variables used in the different models into
some logical structure. They grouped common predictors into
five categories, job satisfaction, biodata, work related data,
personal information and test scores. Reviewing previous
research, Muchinsky and Tuttle noted consistent relationships
between common predictors and turnover in every category
except test scores.
The vast majority of evidence regarding biodata indicated
reasonably consistent ability to predict turnover. While the
correlations were not overly great in magnitude, most were
18
stable upon cross-validation. The research relating personal
factors to turnover also reported consistent results. Age and
length of employment were consistently and negatively related
to turnover. Research relating job satisfaction to turnover
was found to be the most pervasive and most consistent.
Nearly every study involving job satisfaction (of which 39
were reviewed) reported a negative relationship between job
satisfaction and turnover.
Research examining the relationship between work related
factors and turnover was diverse in terms of variables used
and measurement tools. Work unit size and repetitiveness were
positively related to turnover. Receipt of recognition and
autonomy were negatively related to turnover. These results
led Muchinsky and Tuttle to two basic conclusions. First,
turnover is indeed predictable. Second, biodata appeared to
be the best predictor of turnover in terms of strength and
association. Job satisfaction and personal factors were both
consistent predictors of turnover.
One of the leaders in turnover research was Mobley,
Mobley's work represented, in the words of Muchinsky,
A major step forward in thinking of the process (of
turnover) from job dissatisfaction to turnover instead
repeatedly accessing the direct relationship between
dissatisfaction and turnover.
Mobley 's [Ref. 12] intention was to develop a more
complete understanding of the withdrawal (from the
19
organization) process. He felt this required investigation
beyond the replication of the satisfaction-turnover
relationship. He attempted to identify possible intermediate
links in the satisfaction-turnover process. Specifically,
the model suggests that dissatisfaction leads to thoughts of
quitting. These thoughts lead to rational evaluation of the
expected utility of search and of the cost of quitting. If
there is a perceived chance of finding an alternative (and
costs aren't prohibitive) the next step would be intent to
search. Intent to search then leads to actual search.
Alternatives are then evaluated and compared to the current
job. If the comparison favors an alternative it will
stimulate intent to quit, followed by quitting.
The first attempt to evaluate this model was conducted by
Mobley et al [Ref. 13]. They asked the question, does job
satisfaction influence turnover through thinking of quitting,
search and evaluation of alternatives and intention to quit?
Consistent with previous research, they found negative
partial correlations between tenure and satisfaction and
turnover and positive correlation between intention to quit
and turnover. Perhaps the most significant finding was that
the effect of job dissatisfaction was on thinking of quitting
and intentions rather than on turnover itself.
In another attempt to test and fine-tune the Mobley model,
Miller et al [Ref. 14] used hierarchal regression analysis to
20
evaluate the relationships in the Mobley model. Their results
indicated high predictive validity and moderate internal
consistency. All explanatory variables except tenure were
consistently related to turnover. Age and job satisfaction
were negatively related to turnover while chance at obtaining
an alternative job, thinking of quitting and intention to
search were positively related to turnover.
A short time later Arnold and Feldman [Ref. 15] again
evaluated the Mobley model. Their analysis revealed the
variables with the strongest zero-order correlation with
turnover were intent to search, tenure, job satisfaction, and
age. The results of a multiple regression analysis supported
the existence of significant relationship between the set of
explanatory variables and turnover.
A useful starting point for studies by economists is
Parsons [Ref. 16], who reviewed several studies of labor
market turnover (Stigler, 1961, McCall, 1970, Mortensen, 1970,
Gronau, 1971) and suggests that search costs, the wage
dispersion and average alternative wage relative to ones own
wage, will affect a worker's likelihood of seeking out and
accepting another job. He points out that the models suggest
that the quit probability should be negatively related to
one's own current wage relative to the mean of ones
alternative wage distribution. In summarizing the findings
of several industrial cross-section empirical studies (Burton
21
and Parker, 1969, Pencavel , 1970, Parsons, 1972) Parsons notes
that the expected negative relationship of quit rates and
income is strongly supported. Quit rates fall as wages rise.
Parsons [Ref . 17] was later concerned with specific human
capital and its relationship to quit rates. He tested the
proposition that quit rates were negatively related to
workers' investments in specific human capital. Specifically,
large investments in specific human capital are likely to lead
to reduced labor mobility since the economic cost of
separation is increased. Parsons analyzed data for 47
manufacturing industries and concluded that the specific human
capital concept is an important tool in the analysis of labor
mobility. The most important implication of Parsons' work is
that quit rates will be lower, ceteris paribus , in industries
where specific human capital investments are heavy.
Finally, the job matching model argues that we may observe
a positive correlation between wages and tenure and a negative
association between turnover and tenure even if wage offers
do not change with tenure. The argument is that individuals
differ in their suitability to different firms. Those who are
well suited to the firm receive higher wage offers. Those
poorly suited are offered lower wages. The latter group quits
with greater frequency and the former group achieves longer
spells of tenure [Ref. 17]. As firm and worker learning about
match quality occurs early in the worker's tenure, bad matches
22
terminate quickly, so those with long tenure are better
matched, less likely to quit, and have higher wages. Garen
[Ref. 18] points out that several studies (Mincer and
Jovanovic, 1981, Topel, 1986) confirm that the probability of
a job separation is much lower for those with greater tenure
and experience. Garner further develops a framework to show
that the matching process reduces the probability of quitting
as tenure progresses because those who initially stay are
better matched and earn more making it less likely that a
better outside offer will arise.
Jovanovic [Ref. 19] examined the concept of job matching
and turnover as a function of a worker's productivity. He
assumes that for each worker a nondegenerate distribution of
productivity exists across jobs. The same is assumed true for
employers. Wor'Kers differ in their productivities in a given
task that an employer needs to have performed. Jovanovic sees
the problem as one of matching workers to jobs for which they
are best suited. The Jovanovic model predicts that workers
remain on jobs in which their productivity is relatively high
and that they leave jobs in which their productivity is low.
Further, the model predicts that each worker's separation
probability is a declining function of tenure because a




Research on turnover in the military has been separated
from that concerned with turnover in the private sector
because there are several unique characteristics of the
withdrawal process in the military. First, every member of
the military must make an explicit decision to remain or leave
at some point during his tenure. Civilian employees are not
expected to make such a specific decision (especially if they
decide to stay). Also, the decision to leave, in the
military, comes at a single, predictable, point in time. In
the private sector an employee may intend to quit but be
uncertain about when. Reenlistment in the military also means
an obligation to remain for a fixed term. Consequently, the
decision to reenlist carries greater commitment than does the
decision to remain on the job in the private sector. These
characteristics mean that there are higher costs associated
with a poor reenlistment decision in the military and theory
suggests that people will study it more carefully.
As with the civilian sector, studies of the military
turnover process have tended to look at the impact of either
economic variables (pay/ SRBs, unemployment, etc.) or
satisfaction variables on the reenlistment decision.
r In one attempt to isolate the determinants of the
1 reenlistment decision, Lakhani and Gilroy [Ref . 20] proposed
I a three way decision theoretical framework. Their concept was
24
that enlisted members are faced with three discrete choices
toward the end of their term. They can reenlist, separate,
or incur the short commitment of an extension. Individuals
are likely to base their decision on the maximization of
utility.
They estimated a multinomial logit regression model using
data from the 1981 National Longitudinal Survey. The
parameters of the model included economic variables (SRBs, pay
ratio, and unemployment) and noneconomic variables (AFQT
scores, race, number of dependents). This analysis produced
results consistent with the researcher's a priori
expectations. The coefficients of the SRB and
military/civilian pay ratios were positive and significant for
nearly every occupational category.
Hosek and Peterson [Ref. 21] later looked specifically at
the SRB program. The study used data obtained from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) representing all four
services and some 600 skills between 1976 and 1981. Like
Lakhani and Gilroy, Hosek and Peterson used a polychotomous
logit model to differentiate between reenlistments and
extensions. Here the difference between reenlistments and
extensions is significant because those who extend are not
eligible for SRBs. Other than SRBs, the model used
military/civilian pay ratio, unemployment rate, race and
educational level as explanatory variables.
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This research found SRBs to be a very powerful retention
tool. As bonuses increase, reenlistments increase and
extensions fall. Further, lump sum payments were found to be
more cost effective than installment plans, at least for first
term reenlistments.
One interesting conclusion drawn in this study was that
members induced to stay by a bonus are more likely to leave
upon completion of their term. This implies that the
increased use of bonuses at the first and second terms would
likely result in a smaller portion of people entering the over
10 year group. Thus, SRBs can be used to shape force
structure.
Another study of the effectiveness of SRBs was conducted
by Cymrot [Ref. 22], who examined the relationship between
SRBs and the retention of Marine Corps enlisted personnel.
Cymrot grouped 356 Military Occupation Specialties (MOS) into
22 families representing MOSs of similar skills. These
families were then further divided into length of service
"zones" which determine the SRB multiple.
The Annualized Cost of Leaving (ACOL) approach, initially
developed by John Warner and Gary Nelson of SRA Corporation,
was then used to estimate the relationship between SRBs and
reenlistment. This approach assumes a utility maximizing
framework. That is, given a set of alternatives, an
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individual will choose the one that yields the most
satisfaction.
Cymrot found a strong statistical association between
bonuses and reenlistments in nearly every combination of skill
families and zones. Specifically, he predicted that
reenlistments rates would increase by as much as 13.6% in Zone
A (4-6 years of service) simply by increasing the SRB multiple
from to 1. In fact, no other factor included in the model
(unemployment rate, net pay, rank, race) had the impact of
bonus payments.
Baughman and Darnell [Ref. 23] continued to look at the
issue of pay, but they also included in their model some
measures of job satisfaction and organizational commitment.
Baughman and Darnell analyzed a survey of military
members at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, using multivariate
ordinary least squares regression analysis.
This analysis indicated that pay inequity and job
satisfaction did not influence career intent in the presence
of organizational commitment. It did however, fail to address
what organizational commitment is based upon. It seems
reasonable to assume that job satisfaction and pay influence
organizational commitment. Therefore, to say that pay and job
satisfaction do not influence turnover in the face of
organizational commitment ignores any correlation between
these variables.
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Thus far this review of military turnover literature has
concentrated primarily on studies dealing with pay or other
economic concerns. Another body of current literature
specifically considers the impact of job satisfaction and
demographic characteristics on the reenlistment decision. Of
these, several have used data available in the 1985 DOD Survey
of Officer and Enlisted Personnel, the survey used in Chapters
III and IV of this thesis.
Reardon [Ref. 24] for example, attempted to analyze the
relationship between factors known to affect the reenlistment
decision. She grouped explanatory variables into three
categories; demographic, intentions, and satisfaction. She
then used a logit regression model to estimate the impact each
set of variables had on the reenlistment behavior of enlisted
members within 12 months of their decision point.
In a full model, using all three sets of variables, she
found all intent variables, along with race, age, paygrade,
marital status and overall job satisfaction, to be significant
at the .90 level of significance. This model accurately
predicted turnover 81% of the time.
Finn [Ref. 25] also used the 1985 DOD Survey of Officer
and Enlisted Personnel but with a somewhat different purpose.
Finn was concerned with the effects that job satisfaction,
satisfaction with military life, and family environment had
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on the reenlistment behavior of enlisted Marines and in how
these factors differed across occupations.
Finn divided his sample into two occupational groups,
combat arms and non-combat arms, and into two tenure groups,
first term and second term. He then used a logit regression
model to estimate parameters for each of the four groups of
data as well as for the entire original data set.
The estimates from the full regression model showed time
in service, rank, marital status, education, race, job
satisfaction and chance of finding a new civilian job, all to
be significant predictors of reenlistment. This model
correctly predicted behavior 67.5% of the time. While
differences did exist across occupations and terms of
enlistment, job satisfaction, race and chance of finding a
civilian job were consistently significant across all models.
One of the most unique analyses of the data collected in
the 1985 DOD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel was
conducted by Hempel and Parschall [Ref. 26]. They used both
the member and spouse versions of the survey to ask the
questions, "Do intentions change over time?" and Does the
spouse have a significant affect on the members retention
decision?"
To accommodate this analysis, the data was stratified into
groups with homogeneous times to separation. They then used
a logit regression model to estimate a binary choice model.
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reenlist or not. Hempel and Parschall found that enlistments
increased from 4 3.69% in the first term to 91.6% for the third
term. Further, they found that the factors influencing the
reenlistment decision changed as the term of enlistment
changed. For those on their first term (within six months of
separation date) income and marital status were the most
significant variables. Once on the second term of enlistment,
time at sea and job satisfaction headed the list. For those
on their third term of enlistment, only paygrade was
significant.
While Hempel and Parschall concluded that spouse and
family factors did indeed significantly influence the members
reenlistment decision, the model tended to become unstable in
terms of significant coefficients when these variables were
added. This was especially true for the first term where no
variable (other than intent) was significant at the .90 level
of significance.
While these studies have served to increase our under-
standing of the factors affecting the retention decision, one
area appears to have been, for the most part, ignored. That
is the investigation of how the effects of these factors vary
across occupational categories. While Finn [Ref. 25] did
examine combat versus non-combat skills, little work has been
done addressing specific occupational groups.
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Two studies have attempted to do just that with Air Force
occupations. The first was conducted by Lazar and Maloney
[Ref. 27]. They began by looking at 16,000 responses to Air
Force Quality of Life Surveys conducted between 1977 and 1980.
They divided these responses into eight occupational
categories of which five were made up of enlisted specialties.
Factor analysis was then employed as a variable reduction
technique and yielded six general categories of variables, job
satisfaction, economic standing, health care satisfaction, job
autonomy, institutionalism and satisfaction with free time.
Among the results of the analysis was that significant
differences existed between the factors affecting career
intent across the eight occupational categories. Education
and race were the only explanatory variables that remained
stable across all regressions. This result implies that the
factors that are important to one group do not necessarily
reflect the feelings of another group.
A second study that looked across Air Force Specialties
was conducted by Saving and Stone for the Air Force Human
Resources Laboratory [Ref. 28]. Their goal was to estimate
the relationship between national economic conditions and the
ability of the Air Force to retain people. Their analysis
used longitudinal data contained in the Historical Airman Data
File from 1974 to 1982. Explanatory variables were grouped
as either demographic (race, tenure, education, marital status
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and number of dependents) or market (employment data, industry
wage, military compensation, CPI). By looking across
specialties. Saving and Stone were able to include an industry
specific wage rate.
A probit regression model was then used to estimate the
influence each explanatory variable had on the reenlistment
decision. This analysis yielded several interesting results.
First, demographic variables were found to play a
statistically weaker role (ie. the coefficients were smaller
and less significant) in the explanation of reenlistments of
those in their second term than those in their first term.
Females were found to be more likely to reenlist in the first
term but less likely the rest of the time. Race however, was
the most significant demographic variable in every term of
service. AFQT scores were inversly related to reenlistment
likelihood which may be an indication of the higher
opportunity costs of staying in the miliary paid by those with
higher ability.
Also interesting were the results across occupational
specialties. Like Lazar and Maloney [Ref. 27] Saving and
Stone found considerably different effects across specializes.
While some variables such as race and marital status, remained
stable across specialties others, such as unemployment, did
not. This may be the result of two intervening factors, SRB
payments and retraining opportunities.
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While there is still a lot of work to be done in the area
of turnover research, one thing is apparent in current
literature: continuing research into the turnover decision
and the use of advanced statistical techniques (logit and
probit for example) are improving our understanding of the
factors which influence turnover behavior.
D. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY AND THE TRAINING INVESTMENT
One of the goals of this thesis is to determine what
impact the length of specialized skill training has on the
retention decision. While there are several reasons one may
want to study this impact, the primary reason here is cost.
Today 58% of all active force training is specialized skill
training. The projected cost of this training exceeds $4.7
billion for 1990. The Department of Defense estimates that
manpower requirements in support of training will be in excess
of 176,000 manyears in 1990 [Ref. 29].
The question asked here is how these huge investments
affect retention? Are the most thoroughly trained military
members reenlisting or are they selling their skills in the
private sector? Finn [Ref. 25] suggests that those who enlist
for a specific type of training actually maximize the value
of these incentives by using them as soon as possible, that
is, by leaving at the end of the first enlistment. This is
significant because in fiscal year 1988 entrance surveys
33
indicated that 78% of those who enlisted in the Air Force did
so for training. Moreover, 92% listed training among their
top three reasons.
Human capital theory suggests that a person whose skills
command a relatively higher wage in the civilian community
would be less likely to choose to stay in the military. The
question then becomes one of who commands the higher relative
wage? Does the military's investment in training increase the
wage a worker can earn in the private sector, thus providing
those with the most training the greatest incentive to
separate?
In the human capital literature, training is usually
divided into two major categories. General training is
training useful in many firms besides those providing it. For
example, a machinist trained in the Air Force finds his skills
of value in steel and aircraft firms, as well as many others.
Training that increases an individual's productivity only in
the firm providing it is called specific training. In the
military infantrymen and missile officers would be likely
examples. Productivity in these skills is valued more highly
in the military but not (much) elsewhere.
Most of the training offered in the military today is at
least partly general. More than 85% of all enlisted
specialties have a direct civilian counterpart [Ref. 30].
Particularly in the Air Force, training is nearly all general
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because it does not train the classic infantryman or combat
arms soldier. Indeed the Air Force combat jobs, pilots, have
one of the most easily transferred skills.
This thesis will test the hypothesis that those with
longer periods of initial training build larger stocks of
human capital, have better civilian job opportunities, command





The data used in this thesis were drawn primarily from the
1985 DOD Survey of Officer and Enlisted Personnel. [Ref. 31]
The survey was conducted by the Defense Manpower Data Center
for the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Force
Management and Personnel . This survey was conducted in
response to a mandate by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to
survey military families who were increasingly recognized as
important to the retention and readiness of the Armed Forces
.
The survey was organized into nine sections: Military
Information, Present and Past Locations, Reenlistment/Career
Intent, Individual and Family Characteristics, Dependents,
Military Compensation, Benefits and Programs, Family Resources
and Military Life. The population from which the sample was
drawn consisted of active duty officers and enlisted members
who were stationed in the United States or overseas on 30
September 1984. Members considered new accessions, those with
less than four months of service, were excluded from the
population. The survey was administered to approximately
132,000 active duty officers and enlisted members stratified
by service, length of service and sex.
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The original sample consisted of 106,575 enlisted
personnel of which 27,115 were Air Force personnel. The
overall response rate for enlisted personnel was 70.1%, an
unusually high response rate for surveys of this sort. The
Air Force had the highest response rate at 76.7%.
In addition to the survey which contained responses to
selected questions, the 5 July 1989 Enlisted Master File,
which contains basic personnel information about those
respondents still on active duty, and loss files, which
contain the same information for those who have separated,
were used. For this thesis the three files were merged based
on Social Security number matches. This merged file also
contained the actual enlistment behavior of survey
participants. Those matched with loss files had separated and
those matched with the Enlisted Master File, who had passed
a reenlistment point, had reenlisted. In addition, the merged
file contained personnel information for all matched records
that was not in the survey but had been shown in past research
to be significant to the reenlistment decision. This
included, for example, SRB multiples, AFQT scores and length
of enlistment term. Separation codes were also available
which made it possible to distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary separations.
Finally, the average civilian wage for each DOD occupation
code was computed using data from the Civilian Master File
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maintained by the Defense Manpower Data Center. This average
wage was then appended to each survey record based on an
occupation code match.
B. RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED
Because the most serious retention problems confronting
the Air Force today are in the first and second terms, the
data set included only Air Force first and second term
enlisted members. As with any survey data, this sample
contained erroneous responses or responses which made an
individual record unusable for purposes of this analysis.
Therefore, those who either didn't answer a question, or
answered "don't know", were deleted. In addition, since the
model presented in this chapter is meant to be one of
voluntary behavior, all those who were separated either "for
cause" (such as misconduct) or for medical reasons were
deleted. Muchinsky and Tuttle [Ref. 11] suggest both
empirical and theoretical reasons to look at those who quit
and those who are fired individually. On the empirical level,
the few studies that did separate the two groups found
different results. On a theoretical level, the two groups
differ in terms of who initiated the termination, with
voluntary separation being a seemingly more exact
representation of individual behavior.
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Observations with variables with unrealistic values, such
as a two year enlistment term, were removed. Finally, the
data were age restricted to avoid the affect of atypical
airmen; those under 17 years of age were removed from the
sample. Those with no prior service who were either on their
first term of enlistment and were over 34 years old, or on
their second term of enlistment and were over 38 years old
were also removed from the sample. The final data set
contained 8,13 3 records.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODEL
Most models of the turnover process have included
essentially the same variables. They have however, differed
in their categorization of those variables and in their
posited causal order. The theoretical model used in this
thesis was based on several key findings. In their evaluation
of the Mobley model of turnover. Miller et al found general
categories of variables to be more consistent, when cross
validating the model across samples, than very specific
categories (categories representing general information as
opposed to specific cognitive activities). They further found
that Mobley 's hypothesized lines of causality were supported
only about half the time. This indicates that casual ordering
of turnover precursors is possible. In addition, Arnold and




turnover through their impact on intention to quit. To use
intention as a proxy for quit behavior then, may misstate the
significance of explanatory variables on quit behavior. With
these findings in mind, actual staying behavior (reenlistment)
was modeled as a function of four categories of explanatory
variables: demographic (such as sex and race), tenure (such
as time in service), economic (such as wage alternatives) and
cognitive (such as job satisfaction). Since the identical
model is used throughout the analysis, it is presented here
in general form. Individual variable definitions and their
expected signs are discussed below.
Reenlistment = f (Demographic, Tenure, Economic, Cognitive)
D. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variables that were expected to affect the reenlistment
decision were chosen based on the results of studies presented
in the literature review and the authors own experience as an
Air Force enlisted member. Explanatory variables were fit
into one of four categories including tenure, demographic,
cognitive and economic.
1. Dependent Variable (GAINLOSS)
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable
representing the actual reenlistment behavior of the
individuals in the sample. The value is set equal to one if
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the individual reenlisted and equal to zero if he separated.
Table 2 presents a summary of all the explanatory variables
and the direction in which they are expected to affect the
dependent variable.
2. Tenure Variables
a. Time in Service (TIME)
Time in service, originally reported in months, is
a measure of the member's total time on active duty. The data
were converted to fractional years to aid in the
interpretation of the coefficient. Job matching theory
suggests that the matching process between people and jobs
happens early in the relationship and that as a person builds
tenure in an organization he becomes less likely to leave.
A priori, then, this variable is expected to have a positive
sign.
Jb. Prior Service (PSEFV)
Prior service identifies those who were in some
branch of military service, separated, and then rejoined the
Air Force. The variable value was set equal to one if the
member had prior service and zero if he did not. Since a
prior service member retains credit for that service, this
variable should act like a time variable. Those with prior
service should be more likely to reenlist than those without.
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c. Enlistment Term (ENLTERM)
Enlistment term measures the length of the term of
obligated service for the term the member was on at the time
of the survey. Both first and second term airmen can enlist
for four, five or six years. Longer terms of service place
a member's decision point closer to retirement eligibility.
This variable was included to measure the potential
"retirement affect" of the length of term of service.
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d. Military Rank (PAYGRADE)
This variable is a continuous measure of a member's
rank at the time of the survey. Human capital theory suggests
that as an individual experiences wage increases (a function
of rank in the military) he is less likely to quit his current
job because quitting becomes more costly (in terms of lost
pay) and better civilian alternatives become more scarce.
This variable is expected to have a positive sign. As rank
rises so should reenlistment likelihood.
e. Time From Separation (TIMFRSEP)
The survey used in this study was conducted at a
point in time across a randomly selected sample representing
individuals with differing lengths of service remaining on
their enlistment contracts. This variable was included to
allow this difference to be held constant while varying other
characteristics. The variable was set equal to one if the
member had less than one year remaining on his current
contract, two if a member had less than two (but more than
one) years remaining, and so on through six years remaining.
The author had no preconceived ideas about the sign of this
variable.
3. Demographic Variables
a. Number of Children (KIDS)
The survey asked respondents to report the number
of children for whom they provided over half their support.
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As Table 3 indicates, those who reported having one or more
dependents exhibited similar retention behavior (65-75%
reenlisted) but collectively different behavior from those who
reported having no dependents (only 53% reenlisted).
Therefore, this variable was dichotomized to equal one for
those who had dependents and zero for those who did not. It
is expected that as individuals gain more family
responsibility they will be more apt to stay in the service
because costs of quitting are higher, ceteris paribus .
Therefore, this variable is expected to have a positive sign.
TABLE 3
CROSSTAB OF DEPENDENTS AND RETENTION







> 5 70% 30%
b. Marital Status (MARSTAT)
The marital status variable was set equal to one
for those who were married and to zero for those who were not.
Those who reported their marital status as "married first
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time", "remarried", or "separated" were coded as married.
Those who reported their marital status as "widowed"
,
"divorced", or "single" were coded as not married. Previous
studies have shown that married individuals tended to have
greater reenlistment rates than unmarried individuals
[Ref. 24,25]. As with those who have dependents, married
members may tend to feel increased family responsibility and
elect to stay in the military for the benefits and job
security. This variable is expected to have a positive sign.
c. Racietl Origin (RACE)
The Race variable was set equal to zero if the
member was white and one otherwise. Past studies have found
that minorities tended to reenlist at greater rates than
whites. This may be due to perceived reduced opportunities
in the civilian community. This study is expected to confirm
those results thus the variable should have a positive sign.
d. Sex of the Member (SEX)
The SEX variable equals one for females and zero
for males. The expected effect of this variable is difficult
to predict. Past research suggests however, that women may
be more likely to quit than men.
e. Educational Level of the Member
(HISCHOL, SOMECOLL AND COLLGRAD)
For the purposes of this study the education
variable was divided into four categories each represented
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with a dummy variable: those with less than a high school
education (the base case), those with a high school education
(HISCHOL), those with some college but less than a bachelor's
degree (SOMECOLL), and those with at least a bachelor's degree
(COLLGRAD). Those with greater amounts of education should'
on average, command a higher wage in the civilian job market
than those with less education. As such, the opportunity
costs associated with staying in the military should be higher
for those with more education. Increased education should
decrease the probability of reenlistment, other things equal.
f. Mental Category (MENT)
Mental categories are determined by percentile
scores on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) . Mental
Categories are determined as shown in Table 4.
TABLE 4










The variable was constructed using a one-to-one relationship
with mental category. If the individual falls in mental
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category I the value of the variable is one. If the
individual falls in mental category II the value of the
variable is two, and so on. As was the case with education,
those with higher aptitudes should have greater opportunities
in the civilian labor market than those with lower aptitudes.
A priori then, the expected sign of this variable is positive.
g. Age at Entry (AGEATEffT)
The age of the member at the time he came on active
duty was computed by subtracting the length of active service
from the age reported at the time of the survey. Human
capital theory provides a hypothesis for the expected sign of
this variable. In general, younger people have lower
opportunity costs associated with job changes and longer
periods over which to recoup those losses. Job matching
theory suggests that older people may also tend to make more
informed enlistment decisions based on more experience in the
market place. Therefore, older people should be more likely
to reenlist, other things equal.
4. Cognitive Variables
a. Job Satisfaction (SATISF)
This variable measures a member's overall
satisfaction with the military as a way of life. The variable
ranges from a value of one, representing "very dissatisfied",
to a value of seven representing "very satisfied". Much of
the research reviewed in Chapter II of this thesis suggests
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a negative correlation between job satisfaction and turnover
[Ref. 7, 24, 25]. For the purposes of this research, this
relationship suggests that as job satisfaction increases
thelikelihood of reenlistment should increase, other things
equal
.
b. Met Expectations (METEXP)
Met expectations measure the degree to which life
in the military is what the member expected. Members were
asked to indicate their level of agreement with the statement,
"life in the military is what I expected". Response values
were coded so that the values ranged from one, meaning
"strongly disagree" to a value of five, meaning "strongly
agree". Porter and Steers [Ref. 5] suggest that those whose
expectations have been met are more likely to stay than those
whose expectations were not met.
5. Economic Variables
a. Total Taxable Family Income (INCOME)
In his research on the relationship between wages
and turnover, Parsons [Ref. 16] found that as wages rose
turnover fell. This variable, reported in discrete dollars,
attempts to test this finding. Extending Parson's logic, as
total income rises reenlistment should rise, ceteris paribus .
b. Income of the Member's Spouse (SPINC)
This variable measures, to the nearest dollar, the
annual income of the military member's spouse. As the income
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of the spouse rises, the member may be less likely to stay in
the military because of the opportunity costs which occur when
the member's spouse must change jobs. It is expected that
this variable will have a negative sign.
c. Chance of Finding a Good Civilian Job (CIVJOB)
Studies by economists and psychologists alike have
found that the perceived chance of finding an alternative job
affects quit behavior. This variable measures the member's
impression of his or her likelihood of finding a good civilian
job. The variable ranges from one, a zero in ten chance of
finding a civilian job, to 11 , a ten in ten chance of finding
a civilian job. As the perceived chance of finding a civilian
job rises, reenlistment likelihood should fall. Therefore,
this variable should have a negative sign.
d. Selective Reenlistwtent Bonus (SRB)
Lakhani and Gilroy, Hosek and Peterson, and Cymrot
all found positive relationships between Selective
Reenlistment Bonuses and reenlistment likelihood. In fact,
Cymrot [Ref. 22] found no other factor included in his model
ad the affect of bonus payments as a predictor of actual
behavior. The size of the SRB payment to the member is
computed by multiplying a member's basic pay times the number
of years for which the member agrees to reenlist and by some
predetermined SRB multiple. This multiple is a function of
the Air Force specialty in which the member serves. Since the
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actual SRB can not be calculated, the variable used here is
simply the size of the SRB multiple which ranges from zero to
four. As this multiple rises so should reenlistment
likelihood.
e. Alternative Civilian Pay (CIVALr)
Several studies have examined the turnover process
within a utility maximization framework [Ref. 22,25]. Most
of these studies define utility as a combination of pecuniary
and nonpecuniary factors both in and outside the military.
This variable attempts to measure the pecuniary factor outside
the military by quantifying the pay alternatives confronting
the member based on his or her particular skill. The variable
was derived by using DOD occupation codes to match records on
the civilian master file with like records on the file used
in this thesis. When DOD occupation codes matched, the
average annual civilian compensation was appended to the
survey file. As the civilian compensation alternative rises,
reenlistment likelihood should fall, all other things equal.
f. Course Length (CORSLEN)
One of the objectives of this thesis was to
quantify the affect the initial training investment has on
retention behavior. This variable measures the length of
initial specialized skill training in fractional weeks of
training. The information was obtained from the Quantitative
Analysis and Training Costs Division, Headquarters, Air
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Training Command (HQ ATC/ACCQ) and Air Force Regulation 50-5,
Formal Schools. As discussed in Chapter II, human capital
theory suggests that as the investment in training grows so
should an individual's stock of productive capacity and, in
turn, the wage that the individual commands. Thus, as the
course length increases the individual is more invested in the
job, and the probability of reenlistment should fall. This
hypothesis assumes that training is all at least partly
general and that market demands for skills are similar.
E. METHOD OF ANALYSIS
Multivartiate data analysis was used to quantify the
relationships between a set of explanatory variables and a
binary choice dependent variable, reenlist or not. While
there are several estimation techniques that are appropriate
when using a dichotomous dependent variable, the one used here
is the logit model. The model is based on the cumulative
logistic distribution function. That is:
Pi = l/(l+e-'"^"')
where Pi = the probability of reenlistment
Xi = a row vector of individual and Air Force specific
characteristics
Bi = a column vector of parameters to be estimated
It can be shown that if Pi is the probability of reenlistment
and 1-Pi is the probability of not reenlisting, then
Li = ln(Pi/(l-Pi)) = BiXi.
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Here, Li, or the log of the odds ratio, is called the
logit.[Ref. 32]
The logit model was chosen over alternative methods such
as the linear probability model or the probit model for
several reasons. First, unlike the linear probability model,
the logit model restricts the probabilities to lie between
zero and one while the logit itself remains unbounded. That
is.
Pi - when BiXi - -» and Pi - 1 when BiXi - +».
Second, although the logit is linear in X, the
probabilities themselves are not. This is in contrast to
the linear probability model where the probabilities increase
linearly with X [Ref. 32]. It is reasonable to assume that
the change in probabilities will tend to taper off as the
values of the explanatory variables increase or decrease
indefinitely. One more year of service would probably not
affect the reenlistment probability of a member with 16 years
of service to the same extent that it would affect that of a
member with two years of service.
Logit was chosen over probit primarily because it is less
computationally involved. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
is used to estimate model coefficients. The software package
used was SAS, release 5.18.
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F. ESTIMATION PROCEDURE
The data were first stratified by term of service. A Chow
test was performed to make an initial judgement about the
similarity of the estimated parameters across terms of
service. A Chow test is one method of testing for differences
between several regressions. In this test the model is first
estimated for the full sample and then for each subsample.
Estimating the model for the full sample imposes the
restriction that the coefficients of the subsamples are equal.
Then each subsample is estimated independently, which imposes
no restriction on the coefficients. An F test is then used
as follows: . /
F = (S5/K)/(S,/(N1 + N2+...+Nt - tK)
where S^ = the sum of the individual residual sum of squares
from all sub sample regressions.
S5 = the residual sum of squares from the restricted
model minus S^
K = the number of parameters estimated
t = the number of sub samples
N = the sample size of the subsample
This computed F is then compared to a critical F value.
If the computed value exceeds the critical value, the
hypothesis that the regressions are the same may be rejected.
Note that this test is based on OLS regression and not on the
logit procedure.
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Logit regression analysis was then applied to each term
of service individually which allowed comparison of
coefficients to assess differences between the factors
affecting first and second term reenlistment behavior.
The data were then further stratified by occupation, as
defined by the Department of Defense Occupation Conversion
Manual [Ref. 33]. The ten major occupational groupings used
are presented in Table 5. A Chow test was again performed on
these samples to make an initial judgement about their
similarity. Occupational group nine (Non-Occupational) was
dropped from the analysis because many of these individuals
did not possess any specific skill (ie. patient status,
awaiting discharge, etc.) and because the population was so
small
.
The Air Force is concerned not only with the quality and
experience distribution of the total force but with the
manning levels of individual Air Force specialties.
Therefore, performing separate analysis on individual
occupational groupings using the same model will allow another
key question to be answered: Do the factors affecting the









1 Electronic Equipment Repairers 1130
2 Communications and Intelligence Spec. 637
3 Medical and Dental Specialists 632
4 Other Technical and Applied Spec. 314
5 Functional Support and Admin. 2509
6 Electrical/Mechanical Equip. Repairer 1484
7 Craftsmen 382




IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the results of the analysis
described in chapter III. It will also interpret the results,
in an attempt to answer the major research questions of this
thesis. In order to evaluate the logit coefficients, it is
important to remember that they represent the effect of a one
unit change in the explanatory variable (Xi) on the log of the
odds of the dependent variable. [Ref. 34] To estimate the
effect of a unit change in Xi on the actual probability of
reenlistment it can be shown that
aP/aXi = 6i (Pi)(l-Pi)
where 6i = the variable coefficient
Pi = some base case probability.
For the purposes of this analysis, the base case probability
was derived from the estimated logit equation using the
reference groups for all categorical (dummy) variables and the
mean values of the continuous variables. Descriptive
statistics, including the mean value of all variables, are
presented in Table 6
.
There are several possible methods available to measure
the overall goodness of fit of a model. One method that is
appropriate when maximum likelihood estimation techniques are
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used is called a likelihood ratio test. The test statistic
is computed by dividing the value of the likelihood function
when all parameters are set equal to zero by the value of the
likelihood function at its maximum. The ratio has a chi-
square distribution with the number of degrees of freedom
equal to the number of estimated parameters.
The goodness of fit of each model was also measured by
comparing the percentage of cases that the model predicted
correctly to what Cymrot [Ref. 22] refers to as the naive
method. In this comparison the actual characteristics of
individuals are substituted into the model. If the predicted
probability from the equation exceeds 0.5 the individual is
predicted to stay. If it is less than 0.5 the individual is
predicted to leave. A comparison is then made between the
predicted outcomes and the actual outcomes. A prediction is
considered correct when the actual and predicted outcomes are
the same, and incorrect when they are different. The model
is said to provide useful information when the predicted
method is better than the naive prediction rule that everyone
follows the majority [Ref. 22]. Tables presenting the results
of each logit regression include a cross tabulation of
predicted and actual results. As an example of this goodness
of fit test consider Table 7. The naive method would predict
that everyone reenlists, which would be 64% correct. Notice
that the logit model accurately predicts 75.5% of the cases.




VARIABLE N MEAN STD MIN MAX
DEV VALUE VALUE
GAINLOSS 8133 0.646 0.478 0.000 1.000
INCOME 8133 17.251 9.509 3.614 192.385
SPINC 8133 1.738 5.052 0.000 90.000
TIME 8133 4.883 2.555 0.500 13.916
SRB 8133 0.289 0.693 0.000 4.000
CIVJOB 8133 7.656 2.713 1.000 11.000
METEXP 8133 3.308 0.989 1.000 5.000
SATISF 8133 4.653 1.565 1.000 7.000
KIDS 8133 0.436 0.495 0.000 1.000
MARSTAT 8133 0.606 0.488 0.000 1.000
RACE 8133 0.224 0.416 0.000 1.000
SEX 8133 0.465 0.498 0.000 1.000
HISCHOL 8133 0.568 0.495 0.000 1.000
SOMECOLL 8133 0.389 0.487 0.000 1.000
COLLGRAD 8133 0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000
MYMENT 8133 6.214 1.014 2.000 8.000
TIMFRSEP 8133 2.661 1.078 1.000 4.000
ENLTERM 8133 4.180 0.575 4.000 6.000
PAYGRADE 8133 4.132 0.895 1.000 7.000
PSERV 8133 0.060 0.238 0.000 1.000
CORSLEN 8022 12.269 10.407 0.000 63.700
AGEATENT 8133 19.800 2.382 18.000 32.000
CIVALT 6299 22.613 4.135 14.411 32.702
B. FULL MODEL RESULTS
The purpose of this model is simply to identify the
factors affecting the retention of first and second term Air
Force enlisted members. The full model consists of 6253
observations (the SAS procedure used deleted some of the 8133
observations due to missing values) representing members in
both their first and second terms, and all occupational
groups. The dependent variable, GAINLOSS, represents a binary
choice, reenlist or not. It was modeled as a function of
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tenure, demographic, cognitive and economic variables. Table
7 lists the coefficients of each variable along with their
associated standard errors and significance levels. The base
case profile is a white male, single, with no children or
prior service and less than a high school education. The base
case reenlistment probability was .685. The effects of each
explanatory variable on the probability of reenlistment are
discussed below.
1 . INCOME
This variable is significant at the 90% confidence
level. Results indicate that as income rises one thousand
dollars, reenlistment probability falls by . 2 percent. This
result is contrary to a priori expectations. It may simply
indicate that those with relatively higher incomes have more





Significant at the 90% confidence level, the results
indicate that as spouse income rises one thousand dollars the
probability of reenlistment falls by approximately 0.3
percent.
3. SRB
This variable measures the impact of a change in the
SRB multiple itself. Those offered an SRB of multiple one
were 4.1% more likely to reenlist than those who were paid no
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bonus at all. However, those paid a bonus of multiple four
were only 3% more likely to reenlist than those paid a bonus
of multiple three. SRB is significant at the 99% confidence
level.
4. TIME
As expected, the variable measuring time in service
was positively signed and significant at the 99% confidence
level . As the time an individual has in the service rises by
one year, the probability of him or her reenlisting rises by
3.6%. Thus, since second term members have, on the average,
four more years of service than members in their first term,
the probability that a member in his second term reenlists
exceeds that of a first term member by 14.4%. This result




Significant at the 99% confidence level, the negative
sign on this coefficient suggests that an individuals
perception of the civilian job market does matter. As the
individual's perceived chance of finding a civilian job moves
from a 7 in 10 chance to an 8 in 10 chance, the probability
of reenlistment falls by 1.5%.
6. METEXP
The degree to which an individual's expectations of a
job match the actual job was significant at the 90% confidence
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TABLE 7
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON WHOLE SAMPLE
6253 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPI -2.956 0.630 0.001*
INCOME -0.009 0.005 0.062*
SPINC -0.013 0.007 0.098*
SRB 0.191 0.057 0.001*
TIME 0.166 0.024 0.001*
CIVJOB -0.068 0.011 0.001*
METEXP 0.062 0.032 0.059*
SATISF 0.299 0.021 0.001*
KIDS 0.057 0.072 0.426
MARSTAT 0.190 0.071 0.010*
RACE 0.695 0.076 0.001*
SEX -0.504 0.070 0.001*
HISCHOL -0.040 0.412 0.922
SOMECOLL -0.240 0.414 0.561
COLLGRAD -0.601 0.443 0.175
MENT -0.050 0.031 0.109
TIMFRSEP 0.372 0.028 0.001*
AGEATENT 0.032 0.013 0.018*
ENLTERM 0.150 0.056 0.007*
PAYGRADE 0.175 0.063 0.005*
PSERV 0.640 0.138 0.001*
CORSLEN -0.002 0.004 0.536
CIVALT -0.029 0.008 0.000*
Model Chi-square = 1077 .98 with 22 D.F.





TRUE POSITIVE 520 3535 4055
TOTAL 1703 4550 6253
SENSITIVITY: 87.2% SPECIFICITY : 53.8% CORRECT: 75.5%
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level. This suggests that the concept of a realistic job




Without exception, every study reviewed for this
thesis which considered satisfaction as an explanatory
variable found it to have positive and significant affects on
staying behavior. These results are once again confirmed by
this study. Overall satisfaction was significant at the 99%
confidence level. As an individual moves from being
indifferent to being somewhat satisfied, his probability of
reenlistment rises by 6.5%.
8 KIDS
While the sign of this variable suggests that those
with more children tend to stay in the military at greater
rates than those without children, the coefficient is not
statistically significant.
9 MARSTAT
Those who are married do tend to reenlist at greater
rates than those who are unmarried. The probability that a
married member reenlists exceeds that of an unmarried person
by 4.1%. This variable was significant at the 95% confidence
level
10. RACE
Past research suggests that minorities may tend to
stay in the military at greater rates than whites because of
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perceived reduced civilian job opportunities. This research
confirms those findings. Indeed based on computed partial
affects. Race is the single strongest variable in this model.
The probability that a minority will reenlist is 15% greater
than the probability that a white person will reenlist. This
variable is significant at the 99% confidence level.
11. SEX
Women have tended to exhibit lower labor force
participation rates than men. They also tend to have more
broken participation patterns. As such, it is reasonable to
expect women to stay in the military at lower rates than men.
The negative and significant sign of the sex variable confirms
this hypothesis. The probability that a woman will reenlist
is 10.9% lower than the probability that a man will reenlist.
12. HISCHOL, SOMECOLL, COLLGRAD
These dichotomous variables were included to test the
theory that those with more education have better civilian job
opportunities and, as a result, tend to leave the military at
greater rates. As compared to the reference group of those
with less than a high school education, this theory can not
be supported. While each variable exhibits a negative sign,




Results indicate that those in higher mental
categories may tend to leave the Air Force at greater rates
than those in lower mental categories. However, this variable
is only significant below the 11% confidence level.
14. TIMFRSEP
The time from separation variable does play a
significant role in the reenlistment decision. Since those
coded as one made their reenlistment decision in 1985 while
those coded as four made their reenlistment decision in 1989,
this variable may be a trend variable. This result indicates
that the trend, between 1985 and 1989, was that, other things
equal, people became more apt to stay in the military.
15. AGEATENT
As expected, the older a person is when he comes in
the Air Force, the more likely he is to stay. A person who
enlists at age 20 is 0.7% more likely to reenlist than a
person who enlists at age 19. This variable is significant
at the 95% confidence level.
16. ENLTERM
Those who enlist for more than four years are more
likely to reenlist than those who reenlist for just four
years. This result supports the idea of a pension affect.
Longer terms of service place members closer to retirement
(and the benefits associated with military retirement) at the
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decision point than do shorter terms. This "pension affect"
may induce people to reenlist at greater rates than they
otherwise might.
17. PAYGRADE
The positive and significant sign of the paygrade
variable suggests that the more senior in rank an individual
is the more apt he is to stay in the Air Force. An E-5, for
example, is 3.8% more likely to stay than an E-4, ceteris
paribus .
18. PSERV
Results indicate that a person who enlists in the Air
Force with prior service is 13.8% more likely to reenlist than
a non prior service enlistee. Like enlistment term, this
result may indicate a retirement affect. Since prior service
time represents credit toward retirement, those with prior
service are closer to retirement at the end of an enlistment
than those without prior service. In addition, those with
prior service enter the Air Force with first hand experience
with some military service. As such they may enlist with a
much clearer picture of what military life represents.
19. CORSLEN
Course length was negatively signed indicating that
those who attend longer initial specialty skills training may
be more likely to separate than those who attend shorter
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courses. However, this variable is not statistically
significant in this model,
20. CIVALT
The civilian alternative pay variable is negatively
signed, as expected, and significant at the 99% confidence
level. This result confirms the hypothesis that as a member's
civilian pay alternative rises, his probability of
reenlistment falls. Evaluated at the mean, a $1000 increase
in civilian pay alternatives reduces the probability of
reenlistment by 0.6%.
C. TWO TERM ANALYSIS RESULTS
1 . Initial Comparison
The purpose of this analysis was first to identify
those factors which tend to remain significant to the
reenlistment decision across terms of service, and second, to
identify those factors whose effects tend to change across
terms of service. To support this analysis, the sample was
divided into two sub samples, one representing those on their
first term of service (n = 4734) and the other representing
those on their second term of service (n = 3754).
OLS regressions were first run on each subsample and
on the full sample to accommodate a Chow test. The test
resulted in a computed F statistic of 11.87 and a critical F
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statistic of 1.79, which resulted in the rejection of the null
hypothesis that the regressions were the same for both
samples
.
The model used in part A of this chapter was then
estimated for each subsample using the logit technique. The
results of this estimation are presented in Tables 8 and 9.
This was done so that the signs and significance of
explanatory variables could be compared across terms of
service. These estimates resulted in a first term base case
reenlistment probability of .422 and a second term base case
probability of .90. The cross tabulations in Tables 8 and 9
show that in both terms, the model outperformed the naive
method. In the first term the model correctly classified 71%
of the cases while the naive method only predicts 52.5% of the
cases correctly. In the second term the model correctly
classified 84.3% of the cases while the naive method correctly
classified only 75% of the cases.
2. Variable Comparison
A comparison of coefficients across terms of service
shows that while the signs and significance of some variables
do indeed change across terras of service, others are
consistently significant and signed as expected across terms.
For example, although relatively small, CIVJOB is negatively
signed and significant in both cases indicating that civilian
job market perceptions are important to both samples. SATISF
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is positively signed and significant with a much larger
coefficient in both models than that of CIVJOB. This not only
indicates that job satisfaction is a consistent determinant
of reenlistment behavior but that it is a more powerful
determinant than CIVJOB. The RACE variable shows that
minorities tend to reenlist at greater rates than whites in
both terms while the SEX variable shows that women tend to
reenlist at lower rates than men in both terms. TIMFRSEP,
thus far considered a trend variable, implies that the affect
of this trend are positive and significant in both terms.
Several variables appear to be insignificant for both
samples. These include METEXP, KIDS and AGEATENT. While the
signs of the categorical variables representing educational
level (HISCHOL, SOMECOLL, and COLLGRAD) tended to randomly
change from one model to the next, none of the coefficients
can be considered statistically significantly different from
zero.
Somewhat more interesting to study are the variables
whose signs and significance tend to change across terms of
service. Several of the differences may well be due simply
to less variance in the second term sample. For example,
MARSTAT was significant and positive in the first term but
insignificant in the second term. This may be a caused by the
fact that in the first term some 53% of the sample was
unmarried while in the second term only 27.4% of the sample
68
was unmarried. PAYGRADE exhibits similar change. While in
the first term paygrades are distributed across six levels,
E-1 through E-6, and tend to form a normal distribution
pattern around the E-3 and E-4 grades, 95% of the second term
sample was at the E-4 and E-5 paygrades. Finally, MENT is
negative and significant in the first term but insignificant
in the second. While still potentially a homogeneity problem,
the implications here are disturbing. Past research has
suggested that the best people tend to leave the service
first. This result supports that idea. Mental category
significantly affects retention behavior in the first term.
Those in the higher mental categories tend to separate at
greater rates than those in lower mental categories. As a
result, the high end of the distribution (of mental
categories) is essentially cut off. Now we have a less
heterogeneous sample representing lower mental categories
overall. In the data set employed in this thesis, 79% of the
first term sample were in mental categories I-IIIA while only
18% were in category IIIB. However, in the second term, only
68% were in categories I-IIIA and 20% were in category IIIB.
Not all the differences between terms can be
attributed to sample homogeneity. SPINC, for example, was
insignificant in the first term but significant and negative
in the second term. The income distribution of second term
spouses tended to be higher than a similar distribution in the
69
first term. This suggests that spouses of members on their
second term make more money than spouses of members on their
first term. As such, the hardship of frequent moves may
impose greater costs in terms of lost spouse income on second
term families than on first term families.
SRB multiples had a positive and significant affect in
the first term but a negative and significant affect in the
second term. In a study conducted by the Rand corporation,
Gotz and McCall [Ref. 35] suggest that those who are induced
to remain in the Air Force by a bonus leave after receipt of
the bonus. This conclusion is supported here. It may take
an even larger bonus in the second term to get people to stay.
ENLTERM was also positive and significant in the first
term but negative and significant in the second term. This
may also be due to an SRB affect. Because SRB payments are,
among other things, a function of how long the member agrees
to reenlist for, those paid SRBs tended to reenlist for six
years at greater rates than those who were not paid SRBs (11%
versus 2%)
.
CORSLEN was negative and significant in the first term
but insignificant in the second term. This result supports
the hypothesis that those who receive more training may build
larger stocks of productive capacity, command a higher
civilian wage, and thus separate at higher rates than those
with relatively less training. By the time an individual has
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TABLE 8
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON FIRST TERM SAMPLE
2915 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -3.476 0.894 0.001*
INCOME -0.018 0.008 0.030*
SPINC 0.001 0.012 0.931
SRB 2.006 0.225 0.001*
TIME 0.004 0.05 0.935
CIVJOB -0.083 0.015 0.001*
METEXP 0.041 0.045 0.371
SATISF 0.305 0.030 0.001*
KIDS 0.053 0.116 0.646
MARSTAT 0.304 0.107 0.004*
RACE 0.777 0.110 0.001*
SEX -0.190 0.095 0.046*
HISCHOL 0.427 0.574 0.456
SOMECOLL 0.212 0.577 0.712
COLLGRAD -0.017 0.624 0.977
MENT -0.114 0.047 0.015*
TIMFRSEP 0.386 0.065 0.001*
AGEATENT 0.031 0.021 0.137
ENLTERM 0.270 0.079 0.001*
PAYGRADE 0.350 0.103 0.001*
PSERV 1.148 0.251 0.001*
CORSLEN -0.010 0.007 0.041*
CIVALT -0.039 0.011 0.001*
Model Chi -square = 555.14 with 22 D.F.







TRUE POSITIVE 398 1134 1532
TOTAL 1335 1580 2915
SENSITIVITY: 74.0% SPECIFICITY: 67.8% CORRECT: 71.0
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TABLE 9
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON SECOND TERM SAMPLE
3 3 38 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -1.804 1.107 0.103
INCOME 0.008 0.007 0.263
SPINC -0.033 0.010 0.001*
SRB -0.345 0.068 0.001*
TIME 0.314 0.042 0.001*
CIVJOB -0.054 0.016 0.001*
METEXP 0.072 0.050 0.148
SATISF 0.287 0.031 0.001*
KIDS 0.108 0.096 0.259
MARSTAT -0.053 0.114 0.639
RACE 0.589 0.110 0.001*
SEX -0.900 0.112 0.001*
HISCHOL -0.521 0.775 0.501
SOMECOLL -0.755 0.776 0.330
COLLGRAD -1.228 0.807 0.128
MENT 0.012 0.045 0.792
TIMFRSEP 0.433 0.053 0.001*
AGEATENT 0.018 0.019 0.326
ENLTERM -0.338 0.120 0.005*
PAYGRADE 0.123 0.100 0.218
PSERV 0.218 0.170 0.199
CORSLEN 0.000 0.007 0.900
CIVALT -0.009 0.012 0.438
Model Chi -square = 403.47 with 22 D.F.







TRUE POSITIVE 76 2447 2523
TOTAL 443 2895 3338
SENSITIVITY: 97.0% SPECIFICITY: 45.0% CORRECT: 84.3
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moved into the second term of enlistment the length of initial
skills training is no longer significant. By this time
members may have experienced a successful job match. Also,
the effect of retirement benefits becomes stronger.
D. MULTIPLE OCCUPATION ANALYSIS RESULTS
1. Initial comparison
The Air Force is concerned not only with its total
force manning levels but also with ensuring that the correct
number of people are in each occupational specialty. As such,
the purpose of this analysis was to first identify those
factors which tend to be significant to the reenlistment
decision for all occupational groups, and second, to identify
those factors whose affects tend to change across occupational
groups. Are the factors that are important to one
occupational group necessarily important to other occupational
groups? To support this analysis, the sample was divided into
ten subsamples representing each of the major occupational
groups presented in Table 5. OLS regressions were then run
on each occupation unique sub sample, again to accommodate a
Chow test to determine whether or not the coefficients were
the same. The test resulted in a computed F statistic of 14.2
and a critical F statistic of 1.79, which results in the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the regression
parameters were the same for all subsamples. The results of
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logit analysis for each subsample are presented in Tables 10
through 18. Cross tabulations show that in every case the
model out performed the naive method.
2. Variable Comparison
As with the comparison across terms of service, this
comparison across occupational groups shows that while the
signs and significance of some variables do change across
occupations, others remain significant and signed as expected
across occupations. TIME, for example, is positively signed
and significant in six of the nine models, and at least
correctly signed in the remaining three. This result
indicates that as time in service rises the probability of
reenlistment rises in all occupational groups. RACE and SEX
exhibited similar behavior. That is, both variables are
significant and signed as expected across all occupational
groups. Women are less likely to reenlist than men and
minorities are more likely to reenlist than whites in every
occupation. Likewise, SATISF and CIVJOB were fairly
consistent across occupational groups. While CIVJOB did
exhibit a negative sign (contrary to a priori expectations)
for occupational group seven, the coefficient for this group
was insignificantly different from zero. This result suggests
that satisfaction with military life and perceived civilian
job opportunities are important factors in everyone's
reenlistment decision. The TIMFRSEP variable was also
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positive and significant in nearly every group. This "trend"
implies that as time passed from 1985 to 1989, people were
more likely to reenlist in all occupations, ceteris paribus .
While the variables discussed thus far were
significant to the reenlistment decisions of all groups,
INCOME and MENT were not significant to any group. Several
other variables were only significant in a very small number
of cases. SPINC, for example, was only significant for
communications and intelligence specialists. This variable
was signed as expected in six of the nine models. METEXP was
correctly signed and significant only for medical and dental
personnel and craftsmen. These skills may involve duties and
conditions of service in the military that are considerably
different than the duties one normally associates with these
occupations, especially at the lower pay grades. KIDS and
MARSTAT were each significant in only two models. Both
variables were correctly signed in seven of the nine models.
Each of the three dummy variables included to measure the
effect of differing levels of education (HISCHOL, SOMECOLL,
and, COLLGRAD) were significant only for Electrical and
Mechanical Equipment Repairers. In this case the variable was
signed as expected. Those with higher levels of education did
tend to leave the service at greater rates than those with
relatively lower levels of education. ENLTERM was significant
and positively signed only for Electrical and Mechanical
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Equipment Repairers and Service and Supply Handlers. This
variable was however, positively signed in all but one
occupational group.
SRB was negatively signed and significant (meaning
that the SRB multiple rises reenlistment falls) for the
Functional Support and Administration and Craftsmen samples.
This result may be a sample phenomenon in that some 71% of
each of these samples represented second term airmen. Recall
from section B of this chapter, that it may take larger SRBs
in the second term to get people to reenlist who were induced
by a bonus in the first term. More interesting is how the
effects of an SRB payment tended to vary across the remaining
groups. Computed partial affects of increasing an SRB payment
from multiple zero to multiple one ranged from insignificant
in some samples to as high as 14% for Electronics Technicians.
That is, changing the SRB multiple from zero to one increases
the probability of reenlistment for Electronics Technicians
by 14%.
AGEATENT was significant and positively signed for
Craftsmen, Functional Support and Administration and Service
and Supply Handlers. This may be due to the nature of the
work these people tend to perform. Each of these functions
has only a distant relationship with the core mission of the
Air Force, to fly and fight. If young people enlist with a
vision of F-16s and flight lines but end up in jobs that have
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only a distant relationship to this mission, they may be
disappointed with their situation and leave.
PAYGRADE was positively signed in five of the eight
occupational groups but negative and significant for
Electronic Equipment repairers. There are two possible
explanations for this result. First, the opportunities in the
civilian job market for those in the more senior paygrades may
be quite high for Electronic Equipment Repairers. Second,
there may be some correlation between the actual abilities
that command higher wages in the civilian job market and the
abilities that lead to promotion as an Electronic Equipment
Repairer.
PSERV was positive and significant for Functional
Support and Administration and for Electrical and Mechanical
Equipment Repairers. It was negative and significant for
Electronic Equipment Repairers. Perhaps there is some
threshold level of experience beyond which more private sector
jobs open up.
CIVALT was positively signed and significant (as
civilian pay alternative rises reenlistment rises) for
Functional Support and Administration and for Other Technical
and Applied Specialists. Again this may be a function of the
job. People in these jobs tend to enjoy the best working
conditions in the Air Force. As such, it may take more than
money to get them to leave the service. In addition, these
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skills tended to have slightly lower relative civilian pay
alternatives than the other occupational groups.
Also interesting was how the impact of civilian pay
changed across occupational groups. In those samples where
the coefficient was negatively signed, the affect on
reenlistment probability ranged from insignificantly different
from zero to as much as a 7.6% increase in reenlistment
probability. This may indicate not only differences in
relative pay alternatives but differing market demand for
skills as well.
CORSLEN was positive and significant only for
Electronic Equipment Repairers. As discussed with regard to
the PAYGRADE variable, these skills tend to have a number of
potentially valuable upgrade or follow-on courses. Using
initial skills training may not be a valid representation of
the training an Electronic Equipment Repairer receives on his
first two terms of service. This variable was however,
negative and significant for both Electrical and Mechanical
Equipment Repairers and Craftsmen. This result suggests that
the longer the initial skills training the more apt a member
is to separate, ceteris paribus .
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TABLE 10
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP ZERO
AIRCREW
230 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -0.016 43.326 0.999
INCOME -0.018 0.057 0.748
SPINC -0.119 0.081 0.146
TIME 0.412 0.194 0.033*
SRB 9.628 • •
CIVJOB -0.177 0.088 0.043*
METEXP -0.143 0.213 0.502
SATISF 0.557 0.141 0.001*
KIDS 0.099 0.508 0.845
MARSTAT 0.652 0.516 0.205
RACE 0.695 0.533 0.192
SEX 9.796 • •
HISCHOL -7.509 • •
SOMECOLL -8.467 • •
COLLGRAD • • •
MENT -0.171 0.202 0.395
TIMFRSEP 1.023 0.222 0.001*
ENLTERM 0.173 0.218 0.428
PAYGRADE 0.688 0.401 0.092*
PSERV 0.135 1.341 0.919
CORSLEN • • •
AGEATENT 0.067 0.116 0.563
CIVALT • • •
Model Chi-square = 85. 12 with 22 D.F.
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
'
.






TRUE POSITIVE 21 127 148
TOTAL 81 149 230
SENSITIVITY: 85 .8% SPECIFICITY: 73.2% CORRECT: 81.3
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TABLE 11
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP ONE
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT REPAIRMEN
37 2 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR ^
INTERCEPT 7.725 7.220 0.284
INCOME 0.028 0.029 0.328
SPINC -0.060 0.040 0.140
TIME 0.299 0.098 0.002*
SRB 1.043 0.158 0.001*
CIVJOB -0.108 0.062 0.080*
METEXP 0.098 0.159 0.539
SATISF 0.346 0.105 0.001*
KIDS 0.322 0.360 0.371
MARSTAT 0.147 0.364 0.685
RACE 0.654 0.425 0.124
SEX -1.187 0.382 0.001*
HISCHOL 0.377 0.845 0.655
SOMECOLL 0.477 0.800 0.551
COLLGRAD • • •
MENT -0.202 0.201 0.316
TIMFRSEP 0.217 0.139 0.117
ENLTERM 0.237 0.221 0.284
PAYGRADE -0.585 0.312 0.061*
PSERV -2.158 0.833 0.009*
CORSLEN 0.054 0.014 0.001*
AGEATENT -0.042 0.067 0.528
CIVALT -0.350 0.254 0.169
Model Chi--square = 145 .32 with 21 D.F.










TRUE POSITIVE 41 158 199
TOTAL 174 198 372
SENSITIVITY: 79. 4% SPECIFICITY: 76.9% CORRECT: 78.2%
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TABLE 12
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP TWO
COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALISTS
192 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -16.821 110.589 0.879
INCOME 0.041 0.040 0.309
SPINC -0.103 0.062 0.094*
TIME 0.192 0.144 0.184
SRB 0.365 0.143 0.011*
CIVJOB -0.030 0.077 0.688
METEXP 0.166 0.194 0.390
SATISF 0.147 0.135 0.276
KIDS 0.066 0.402 0.860
MARSTAT -0.303 0.480 0.527
RACE 0.648 0.465 0.163
SEX -0.770 0.489 0.115
HISCHOL 17.847 • •
SOMECOLL 17.764 • ^
COLLGRAD 17.564 • •
MENT -0.249 0.216 0.249
TIMFRSEP 0.132 0.175 0.451
ENLTERM 0.125 0.365 0.731
PAYGRADE -0.376 0.385 0.328
PSERV 8.675 • •
CORSLEN 0.016 0.068 0.812
AGEATENT 0.071 0.098 0.471
CIVALT -0.065 0.043 0.130
Model Chi.-square == 58 .51 with 22 D.F.









72] ] 45 ] 27 ]
TRUE POSITIVE ] 15 ] 105 ] 120
TOTAL ] 60 ] 132 ] 192
SENSITIVITY: 87.5% SPECIFICITY: 62.5% CORRECT: 78.0
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TABLE 13
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP THREE
HEALTH CARE SPECIALISTS
529 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -0.681 2.896 0.814
INCOME 0.001 0.015 0.915
SPINC -0.025 0.024 0.286
TIME 0.247 0.086 0.004*
SRB -0.844 0.679 0.214
CIVJOB -0.110 0.038 0.004*
METEXP 0.228 0.111 0.039*
SATISF 0.228 0.073 0.001*
1 KIDS 0.292 0.252 0.246
1 MARSTAT -0.000 0.251 0.997
1 RACE 0.677 0.259 0.009*
1 SEX -0.494 0.248 0.047*
1 HISCHOL 1.433 1.462 0.326
1 SOMECOLL 1.539 1.456 0.290
1 COLLGRAD 0.465 1.487 0.754
1 MENT 0.008 0.135 0.952
1 TIMFRSEP 0.242 0.106 0.023*
1 ENLTERM 0.324 0.231 0.161
1 PAYGRADE -0.234 0.234 0.317
PSERV 0.710 0.497 0.153
CORSLEN 0.036 0.036 0.324
AGEATENT -0.005 0.043 0.899
I
CIVALT -0.197 0.100 0.050*
1 Model Chi-square = 97 .12 with 22 D.F.
1











TRUE POSITIVE 46 295 341
TOTAL 136 393 529
SENSITIVITY: 86.5% SPECIFICITY : 47.9% CORRECT: 7 2.8
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TABLE 14
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP FOUR
OTHER TECHNICAL AND APPLIED SPECIALISTS
308 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -4.236 23.664 0.857
INCOME -0.008 0.019 0.680
SPINC 0.036 0.039 0.355
TIME 0.163 0.105 0.122
SRB 1.114 0.323 0.001*
CIVJOB -0.126 0.057 0.027*
METEXP -0.118 0.166 0.475
SATISF 0.346 0.104 0.001*
KIDS 0.352 0.359 0.326
MARSTAT 0.034 0.374 0.926
RACE 0.664 0.396 0.093*
SEX -1.436 0.353 0.001*
HISCHOL -2.697 23.535 0.908
SOMECOLL -3.149 23.534 0.893
COLLGRAD -2.573 23.541 0.912
MENT 0.157 0.164 0.339
TIMFRSEP 0.308 0.129 0.017*
ENLTERM 0.201 0.309 0.513
PAYGRADE -0.001 0.282 0.996
PSERV 0.768 0.668 0.249
CORSLEN -0.036 0.036 0.314
AGEATENT 0.025 0.064 0.693
CIVALT 0.168 0.066 0.011*
Model Chi-•square = 72 .81 with 22 D.F.










TRUE POSITIVE 28 169 197
TOTAL 98 210 308
SENSITIVITY: 85. 8% SPECIFICITY : 63.1% CORRECT: 77. 6%
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TABLE 15
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP FIVE
FUNCTIONAL SUPPORT AND ADMINISTRATION
2129 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT -4.635 1.251 0.001*
INCOME -0.012 0.008 0.145
SPINC 0.006 0.013 0.625
TIME 0.133 0.041 0.001*
SRB -0.500 0.135 0.001*
CIVJOB -0.076 0.019 0.001*
METEXP 0.060 0.056 0.282
SATISF 0.264 0.036 0.001*
KIDS 0.191 0.123 0.121
MARSTAT 0.073 0.128 0.568
RACE 0.854 0.124 0.001*
SEX -0.366 0.122 0.002*
HISCHOL 0.165 0.671 0.805
SOMECOLL 0.071 0.674 0.915
COLLGRAD 0.144 0.730 0.843
MENT -0.009 0.056 0.868
TIMFRSEP 0.389 0.052 0.001*
ENLTERM 0.030 0.107 0.773
PAYGRADE 0.208 0.112 0.064*
PSERV 0.623 0.266 0.019*
CORSLEN 0.012 0.026 0.632
AGEATENT 0.030 0.019 0.099*
CIVALT 0.065 0.038 0.088*
Model Chi--square == 305 .41 with 22 D.F.







TRUE POSITIVE 135 1335 1470
TOTAL 455 1674 2129
SENSITIVITY: 90.8% SPECIFICITY: 48.6% CORRECT: 77.7%
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TABLE 16
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP SIX
ELECTRICAL AND MECHANICAL EQUIPMENT REPAIR
1425 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT 0.458 1.968 0.815
INCOME -0.024 0.015 0.107
SPINC -0.021 0.019 0.269
TIME 0.199 0.059 0.001*
SRB 0.140 0.146 0.337
CIVJOB -0.028 0.023 0.234
METEXP -0.008 0.074 0.910
SATISF 0.350 0.046 0.001*
KIDS 0.195 0.169 0.247
MARSTAT 0.497 0.173 0.004*
RACE 0.680 0.189 0.003*
SEX -0.654 0.175 0.001*
HISCHOL -1.965 1.133 0.083*
SOMECOLL -2.355 1.139 0.038*
COLLGRAD -4.170 1.323 0.001*
MENT -0.069 0.066 0.298
TIMFRSEP 0.407 0.058 0.001*
ENLTERM 0.299 0.149 0.044*
PAYGRADE 0.259 0.143 0.071*
PSERV 0.904 0.259 0.001*
CORSLEN -0.038 0.019 0.050*
AGEATENT 0.035 0.033 0.291
CIVALT -0.111 0.041 0.007*
Model Chi-square = 325.20 with 22 D.F.







TRUE POSITIVE 122 807 929
TOTAL 424 1001 1425
SENSITIVITY: 86.9% SPECIFICITY: 60.9% CORRECT: 77.8%
®5
TABLE 17
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP SEVEN
CRAFTSMEN
378 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR P
INTERCEPT 0.489 27.343 0.985
INCOME -0.032 0.024 0.192
SPINC 0.007 0.044 0.861
TIME 0.183 0.118 0.121
SRB -0.911 0.523 0.081*
CIVJOB 0.014 0.052 0.778
METEXP 0.229 0.135 0.100*
SATISF 0.445 0.100 0.001*
KIDS -0.612 0.350 0.080*
MARSTAT 0.642 0.450 0.063*
RACE 1.213 0.405 0.002*
SEX -0.311 0.353 0.378
HISCHOL -5.790 • •
SOMECOLL -6.406 • •
COLLGRAD -9.957 • •
MENT -0.105 0.144 0.464
TIMFRSEP 0.549 0.133 0.001*
ENLTERM -0.147 0.257 0.566
PAYGRADE 0.504 0.298 0.090*
PSERV 0.557 0.579 0.335
CORSLEN -0.040 0.031 0.089*
AGEATENT 0.102 0.054 0.101
CIVALT -0.044 0.146 0.760
Model Chi--square = 107 .59 with 22 D.F.
* Signi ficant at the 90% confidence level.
'
.






TRUE POSITIVE 37 197 23
TOTAL L28 250 37
SENSITIVITY: 84 .2% SPECIFICITY: 63.2% CORRECT: 76.2%
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TABLE 18
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ON OCCUPATIONAL GROUP EIGHT
SERVICE AND SUPPLY HANDLERS
690 OBSERVATIONS
VARIABLE BETA STD. ERROR p i
1 INTERCEPT -8.634 2.032 0.001*
j INCOME 0.006 0.016 0.705
j SPINC -0.032 0.026 0.221
j TIME 0.207 0.074 0.005*
j SRB 7.434 , •
1 CIVJOB -0.021 0.030 0.496
METEXP 0.087 0.096 0.363
SATISF 0.346 0.061 0.001*
KIDS -0.008 0.205 0.968
MARSTAT 0.017 0.217 0.935
RACE 0.178 0.216 0.411
SEX -0.559 0.208 0.007*
HISCHOL 1.908 1.284 0.137
SOMECOLL 1.700 1.288 0.187
COLLGRAD 1.182 1.384 0.392
MENT 0.004 0.095 0.961
TIMFRSEP 0.268 0.086 0.001*
ENLTERM 0.215 0.132 0.087*
PAYGRADE 0.132 0.190 0.487
PSERV -0.005 0.447 0.989
CORSLEN 0.001 0.035 0.963 i
0.040* 1AGEATENT 0.085 0.041
CIVALT 0.041 0.040 0.298
Model Chi-square = 116.11 with 22 D.F.










TRUE POSITIVE 73 344 417
TOTAL 235 455 690




This thesis investigated the factors which influence the
retention decisions of Air Force enlisted members with respect
to term of service and major occupational group. While the
directions of the effects of most variables were consistent
with a priori expectations, there were significant differences
in the magnitudes and levels of significance from one term to
the next and from one occupational group to the next. This
suggests that policies to improve retention which affect all
people equally may not be as efficient as policies which
target specific groups of people. Therefore, while some
retention issues may be dealt with on a macro level, others
should be dealt with on a micro level.
The Air Force has little or no control over some of the
factors used as explanatory variables in the models examined
in this research. These include the chance of finding a good
civilian job and civilian pay alternatives. While policy
makers should remain aware of how these factors affect
retention and how they vary over time, the remainder of this
section will concentrate on those factors that the Air Force
can control through recruiting policy or personnel programs.
Factors which the Air Force can control and which had
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similar effects on the retention probability of all groups
were sex, race, age, TIMFRSEP, and overall satisfaction.
Recruiting policy can affect sex, race, age and TIMFRSEP.
Race is important because minorities tended to have a 15%
greater probability of reenlisting than white people. Sex is
important because women tended to have a 10.9% lower
probability of reenlisting than men. This result suggests
that, using retention as the only measure of effectiveness,
advertising dollars may be better spent trying to attract
minorities rather than women. The services now actively
recruit women as an alternative to the traditional white male.
A more cost effective population to target may be minorities.
This result further implies that a goal of proportional
representation by sex and race may not be the minimum cost
method of staffing the Air Force. Political considerations
aside, it may be less expensive to over represent minorities
and under represent women.
The trend variable also had similar effects across
different groups of people. The significance of the trend
variable suggests that policy makers should not assume that
retention behavior remains constant over time. Reenlistment
probabilities may change over time because of changing job
opportunities or because of the world situation as a whole.
Public opinion of the military and its role may also affect
retention over time. Therefore, recruiting policies aimed at
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advertising should attempt to project the Air Force image as
one of a "high tech" service whose goal is the preservation
of peace.
Finally, since older people tended to stay at slightly
greater rates than younger people (a person who was 20 years
old when he enlisted is 0.7% more likely to reenlist than a
person who was 19 years old at enlistment) the Air Force may
want to examine the total cost of recruiting them. Older
people may, however, turn out to be a more expensive
alternative because the effect of age on reenlistment
probability was small and the cost of maintaining an older
force may be higher due to larger families, more medical
expenses, etc.
While recruiting policies can be used to affect the
factors discussed so far, personnel policies can be used to
affect others. Foremost among these is overall satisfaction.
Overall satisfaction with the military was the most consistent
variable, in terms of sign and significance, across all
models. This implies that satisfaction is an important
determinant in the retention decision of all members. A
person who is satisfied with the Air Force was 6.5% more
likely to reenlist than a person who is indifferent about the
Air Force. This suggests that personnel policies should be
aimed at improving the overall quality of life enjoyed by the
enlisted staff. This may include not only satisfaction with
90
a job but everything from satisfaction with the quality of
service a person receives from a staff agency to the quality
of base housing.
Personnel policies can also be used to affect those
factors whose effect tended to vary from one group of people
to the next. These include SRB payments, paygrade, marital
status and spouse's income. Consider, for example, the effect
of SRBs. These results indicate that an SRB will increase the
probability of reenlistment for electronics technicians by
9.2% but will have no effect on the retention of medical and
dental personnel. This difference may be caused by the
lucrative opportunities awaiting electronics technicians in
the private sector relative to those awaiting medical and
dental personnel. If it is money that is causing electronics
technicians to separate, money, in the form of bonuses, may
induce them to stay. On the other hand, money may not be as
important to the reenlistment decision of medical and dental
personnel so the returns to the Air Force from paying a bonus
are smaller. Therefore, SRBs should continue to be targeted
to specific occupations to ensure the money is spent as
efficiently as possible.
The effects of paygrade varied in terms of both magnitude
and direction. This suggests that, as was the case with SRBs,
an improved personnel policy may allow promotion rates to vary
from one function to the next. Perhaps policy should be
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tailored to offer people in skills in which paygrade has a
positive and significant effect, a somewhat higher promotion
opportunity than those people in skills where paygrade has a
relatively small or negative effect.
Marital status significantly increased the retention
probability of those on their first term. Those who were
married were 4.1% more likely to reenlist than those who were
unmarried. Therefore, the Air Force should continue to
develop its family programs, especially those aimed at younger
people such as Family Services and variable child care fees.
Spouse's income, on the other hand, was significant to the
retention decision of only those on their second term. This
suggests that the Air Force should either increase the
emphasis on programs aimed at reducing the frequency of moves,
like the Variable Stabilized Base of Preference Program, or
take steps to ease the burden of relocating spouses who work.
Some of the personnel and data structures to do this already
exist. One indication was the Spouse Sponsorship Program
tested by the Strategic Air Command in 1985. The goal of this
program was to match spouses with spouses at the gaining
location who worked in similar fields. The work load demands
on the people managing the program were minimal and the
existing personnel data system easily accommodated the
program. The information was simply made a part of the
existing sponsorship program.
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Of the factors whose effect tended to change from one
group to the next, two have recruiting policy implications.
They are the length of initial skills training and enlistment
term. Retention in the first term was significantly affected
by the length of initial skills training. This suggests that
varying the length of initial service obligations may be
warranted. Those who attend longer courses would incur longer
initial service obligations. Further, since the length of the
enlistment term positively affected retention probability in
the first term, programs encouraging longer voluntary initial
terms should be pursued. For example, offering those who
enlist for six years one or two stripes upon completion of
basic training will cost only a small amount in basic pay
(they're promoted to E-2 normally in six months and the pay
difference is minimal) and will increase their reenlistment
probability by 13.2%.
B. AREAS OF FUTURE RESEARCH
As with most empirical research, this study leaves room
for additional research. Some specific areas for future
research are discussed below.
A better picture of the civilian labor market may shed
more light on how this market affects retention.
Specifically, future research into the factors affecting
retention decisions should include some measure of regional
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unemployment. Additionally, the civilian pay alternative used
in this study was limited in scope to just civil servants.
The pay scale of civil servants may not be representative of
the true alternatives an enlisted member is confronted with
at the end of a term of service. With the data being
collected in the 1990 Census, and a crosswalk tape being
developed by DMDC, future research may be able to include a
more accurate estimate of true civilian pay alternatives and
any effect differentials have on reenlistment decisions.
While differences in the factors affecting retention were
identified across term of service and occupational group,
future research should look across occupational groups for
specific terms individually. That is, examine a sample of
just first term members stratified by occupational group.
This would allow for more precise estimates of how these
factors tend to vary for specific groups at specific times.
This research also suggests that, from a retention point
of view, minorities and older people may be more cost
effective than women or younger people respectively. Future
research should compare the total cost of these population
pools including costs associated with recruiting, attrition
and retention.
Overall satisfaction also appears to affect the
probability of reenlistment. However, no attempt was made
here to identify what makes up satisfaction. Future research
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may want to examine what causes satisfaction or
dissatisfaction and how each component affects the retention
decision.
Marital status also appears to affect retention although
why is not as clear. A more thorough look at the factors that
make up marital status may yield more concrete policy
alternatives. That is, does the spouse's satisfaction with
military life matter or do services become more important?
Finally, to fully evaluate the impact of individuals with
different amounts and kinds of training, future research
should include not only initial skills training but some
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